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2

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents, the Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining
(hereinafter "Board") and Gulf Oil Corp. (hereinafter "Gulf"),
filed a petition to rehear the matter decided by this Court in
Bennion v. Gulf, No. 19144, filed on August 19, 1985.

This

matter was an appeal of a Summary Judgment granted in favor of
Gulf and the Board holding that the Board had proceeded and
acted within its authority in allowing a test well to be redesignated as a production well within a 640 acre drilling unit.
On appeal, this Court reversed the lower court, vacated the
Board's earlier Order and remanded the case to the Board with
the instruction to enter an Order that the second well drilled
by Gulf in the 640 acre unit of Section 8, Township 3 South,
Range 5 West, Duchesne County, Utah, is and has been producing
in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 40-6-6(e) (1953).

Fur-

ther, this Court relieved Bennion of all obligations to share in
the cost of drilling the second well.
In addition to the Board's lack of statutory authority,
this Court found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that it was more equitable and reasonable to shut in the
first well and redesignate the second well as the production
well.

Subsequent to that decision, Gulf and the Board both

filed petitions for rehearing in this Court.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

THE PROPER STANDARD IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO GRANT A
PETITION FOR REHEARING IS WHETHER THE COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED SOME MATERIAL MATTER OF LA.
OR FACT WHICH HAD IT BEEN GIVEN CONSIDERATION, WOULD
LIKELY HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT A DIFFERENT RESULT.
Gulf and the Board each respectively filed a petition

for rehearing with this Court after this Court had handed down
its decision reversing the District Court and vacating the
Board's previous order.

Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, which governs a petition for rehearing, states that
the petition shall state with particularity the points of law o:
fact which the petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or
misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the
petition as the petitioner so desires.
The purpose of a petition for rehearing ... is
to direct the court's attention to some
material matter of law or fact which it has
overlooked in deciding a case, and which,
had it been given consideration, would
probably have brought about a different
result.
National Labor Relations Board v. Brown and Root, 206 F.2d 73,
74 (8th Cir. 1953).
(9th Cir. 1962).

See also, Anderson v. Knox, 300 F.2d 296

A petition for rehearing should be allowed

only in rare instances.

Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v.

Western Pacific Railroad Co., 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953).

4
In addition, the petition for rehearing should not
present arguments on the merits, but rather, arguments in favor
of the petition for rehearing.

The petition is merely seeking

leave to argue and should confine itself to a statement of the
points overlooked. Gershenhorn v. Walter R. Stutz Enterprises,
306 P.2d 121 (Nev. 1957).
It should be brief and it should not be
argumentative; it should point to the
conflict created by or the controlling
matter overlooked in the original decision.
It should not be expected to also serve the
role of persuading the court how the conflict or error should be resolved. That is
the object of resubmission. The object of
the petition is only to show that the
petitioner is entitled to a rehearing, not
that he is entitled to a different decision
on the merits .
.!i..:_, 306 P.2d at 121.

Counsel should not be permitted to argue their cases in
a piecemeal fashion.

Moreover, where counsel has merely failed

to previously argue a point in their briefs or their oral
argument, such argument will not be considered when raised in
the petition for rehearing.

Smith v. Crocker First National

Bank of San Francisco, 152 Cal. App. 2d 832, 314 P.2d 237
(1957).
Gulf and the Board, for the reasons stated below have
failed to show that this Court overlooked or misapprehended any

5

material law or fact which would have changed the outcome of i'
decision and their petition for rehearing should be denied.

II.

THE BOARD HAS NO BASIS TO CLAIM THAT THE COURT OVERLOOKED MATERIAL LAW OR FACTS WHERE IT NEITHER FILED A
BRIEF NOR ARGUED ORALLY.

The Board and Gulf had ample opportunity during the
hearing before this Court to set forth the facts and arguments
which they deemed important in consideration of the merits of
their case.

However, the Board did not file a brief with this

Court nor did it participate in oral argument before this Court.
Rather, the Board's first participation in this appeal was in
the form of a petition for rehearing after this Court had
already heard and decided the matter.
The court in Carr v. Federal Trade Commission, 302 F.2c
688 (1st Cir. 1962), in facts analogous to the case at bar,
found that an agency would not be granted a rehearing where it
had opportunity to argue from agency orders but failed to bring
those orders to the attention of the Court.

The court stated:

But a court cannot be expected to rummage
among administrative writings and consent
orders sua sponte when the party most
directly involved and knowledgeable makes no
suggestion that anything would be found
there.
For a governmental agency best
familiar with its own practice with respect
to a matter directly in issue, and now said
to be of paramount importance, to make no
mention of the subject until after it had
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lost a case on another ground, if deliberate, is a breach of duty to the court, if
inadvertent, is still inexcusable. The
Commission's petition for rehearing raising
this allegedly vital point contains no
mention of why it was first developed at
this late date, let alone any apology for
doing so.
Id.302 F.2d at 692.
No reason is given by the Board for its failure to file
a brief or argue orally before the Court any of its assertions
contained in its petition for rehearing.

The Board's delay in

making any argument at all should preclude the Board from now
arguing in the petition for rehearing.
III.

THE COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND ANY MATERIAL
FACTS PRESENTED AT THE INITIAL HEARING AND PETITLONERS
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A REHEARING.
Gulf and the Board claim that this Court misapprehended

the following statement in the record by Gulf's witness, Mr.
Mark Anthony.
We have no idea what the extent of the
reservoir is. We can't know that at this
time. We realize that this whole field is
-- apparently the reservoir due to the
geological structure of the thing -- it's
almost impossible to determine what's going
to happen from one well to the next as far
as correlating sands and production.
(Bennion Reply Brief at p. 10.)

Gulf and the Board claim that Mr. Anthony's statement
was referring to another well,

the Josephine Voda No.

rather than the Albert Smith No.

2 well,

2 well, which is the subject

this action.
Bennion did not misstate the record.

The Albert Smith

No. 2 well was the subject matter of the hearing where the
statement was made.

Mr. Anthony's statement pertains to the

geological structure of the entire reservoir and not just one
well.

Mr. Anthony states that due to the geological structure

of the field it is almost impossible to predict the production
from one well to the next.

This statement would apply to the

Albert Smith No. 2, the Josephine Voda No.

2 well and any othec

well drilled within the field (the Albert Smith No. 2 well,
although not adjacent to the Josephine Voda No. 2 well, is onl1
one section away and is clearly within the same field).

Mr.

Anthony's statement merely indicates that the Board had
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that it was more equitable
or reasonable to shut in the Albert Smith No.
redesignate the Albert Smith No.

1 well and

2 well as the production well

due to the uncertainty regarding the field and underlying
reservoir.

This is further illustrated by the i'act that at t"·0

time of the hearing in the Dist:rict Court,
2 well was producing an average of only
compared to the 850 barrels per month that

the Albert Smith iJ,
barrels per month
WilS

pre•:ic>us ly be:·

8
produced by the Albert Smith No. 1 well.
Bennion at p. 9.)

(Reply Brief of

This Court's determination that the Board had

insufficient evidence to determine that the Albert Smith No. 2
well should be designated as the production well for Section 8
is easily substantiated by the record.
Moreover, the alleged misconstrued quote was included in
Bennion's reply brief.

(Reply Brief of Bennion at p. 10.)

Gulf

and the Board had ample opportunity to argue the applicability
of the quote at oral argument.

The fact that they chose not to

do so is not grounds for rehearing, but merely indicates Gulf
and the Board's attempt to reargue the issues already resolved
by this Court.
This Court found that the evidence was not sufficient to
support the Board's action in determining that the Albert Smith
No. 2 well should become the production well for Section 8.

In

addition, this Court stated that its decision would be the same
regardless of whether the Board found that the Albert Smith No.
2 well could be a commercial well for reasons stated in Argument

IV.
Petitioners claim that this Court overlooked the protection being afforded to Mr. Bennion's correlative rights is
again improper in the petition for rehearing and is without
merit.

Gulf, in its original brief filed with this Court,

argued that the correlative rights of Mr. Bennion were being

protected.

Gulf and the Board, in their petitions for rehear-

ing, again argue that Bennion's correlative rights were being
protected, and further attempted to show this Court that Mr.
Bennion would be receiving greater returns from the Albert Smit:
No. 2 well than he was previously receiving from the Albert
Smith No. 1 well.

Gulf and the Board are merely attempting to

reargue their case on the merits.
Under the Board's order, Mr. Bennion's correlative
rights were not protected as evidenced by the failure of the
Board to follow the express statutory mandates of Utah law.
Those mandates were adopted in order to provide for the ef ficient extraction of the minerals and oils and to provide for
protection of interest owner's correlative rights.
Ann. §40-6-6(d)

(1953).

Utah Code

This is further indicated by the fact

that prior to "shutting in" the Albert Smith No. 1 well, Mr.
Bennion was receiving 100% of his interest in that well.
Albert Smith No. 2 Well, Bennion would receive only an
one-eighth royal interest for a substantial period of time due
to the Board's order that Gulf recoup its drilling costs for
this second well from 7/8ths of Bennion's interest.
Gulf and the Board's claim that this Court misunderstC'
the statement by Mr. Anthony and the facts presented in the
case, is merely an attempt by Gulf and the Board to reargue t:.c
merits of the case and is improper in a petition for rehearing
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This Court has not overlooked or misapprehended the evidence
presented in the initial hearing and no grounds for rehearing
exist in this matter.

The petition for rehearing filed in this

case should therefore be denied.
IV.

THIS COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND THE BOARD'S
PLAN OR FINDINGS OF FACT, BUT RATHER FOUND THAT THE
BOARD'S ACTIONS DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH'S STATUTES.

Gulf and the Board, in their petitions for rehearing,
argue that this Court overlooked and failed to perceive the
Board's statutory authority under Section 40-6-6(d) to authorize
the drilling of additional wells pursuant to a "reasonably
uniform plan in the pool or any zone thereof".

This argument by

petitioners is incorrect and does not justify Gulf and the
Board's motion for rehearing.
This Court, in deciding the case, not only recognized
the authority granted in Section 40-6-6(d), but even cited that
section in its decision.

After citing the section, this Court

found that the Board's order "did not authorize the drilling of
additional wells on a uniform plan in the pool or any zone
thereof''.

Gulf and the Board's claim that this Court overlooked

the above section is clearly unfounded as evidenced by this
Court's citation and consideration of Section 40-6-6(d) in the
Court's opinion itself.

11

Gulf and the Board iurther allege that the Board was
acting pursuant to a plan and that this Court failed to percei
the Board's plan.

This claim by Gulf and the Board is again

incorrect and improper in this petition for rehearing.

Gulf

the Board had every opportunity to present their argument to
this Court.

Their claim is that the Board acted pursuant to a

plan in authorizing for drilling and designating the Albert
Smith No. 2 Well as the producing well for the unit.

As previ-

ously noted, the Board declined to file any brief with this
Court or to make any argument regarding any matter when given
the opportunity before this Court.

Gulf, in its brief, did no:

argue that the Board was acting pursuant to statutory authoric:
and pursuant to a reasonably uniform plan.

As stated above,

issues which were not raised in the brief or in oral argument
are not properly brought up for the first time in a motion for
rehearing.
Gulf and the Board, by claiming in their petition for
rehearing,

that the Board was acting pursuant to a plan and thi

the Court failed to perceive such plan, are simply trying to
reargue the merits of the case, rather than to show that this
Court has overlooked some material law or fact which would
change the outcome of the case.

In addition, Cult and the

Board's claim that the Board was acting pur3uant to a reasonJt
uniform plan is without merit.

12
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Gulf and the Board claim that the Board was acting
pursuant to a plan which was evidenced by the orders entered by
the Board regarding Section 8.

Court believe that the Board's actions regarding Section 8, only
one of many sections within the Altamont Bluebell Region,
constitutes the Board's reasonably uniform plan in the pool or
any zone thereof.

·evi-

Petitioners would have this

Petitioners, in making such an argument, seem

to be placing the horse before the cart.

The statutory authori-

ty granted in Section 40-6-6(d) states that the Board may
ren

"authorize the drilling of additional wells if done pursuant to

l not

a reasonable uniform plan in the pool or zone thereof".

The

statute contemplates the existence of a plan prior to the
drilling of additional wells.

I

iI I

In this case, the Board

authorized the drilling of an additional well prior to any
for

for

::l thi

to

his

formulation or adoption by way of modification of the Board's
original order in 139-8 which had adopted a uniform plan for the
drilling of only one well per section.
Gulf and the Board's characterization of the Board's
actions as being the plan itself, is not in harmony with the
mandates of Section 40-6-6(d) and does not support the Board's
actions in this matter.

That was exactly the finding by this

Court where it stated in its opinion that the Board's order did
not authorize the drilling of additional wells on a "uniform
plan in the pool or any zone thereof".
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